Phase transition and hysteresis loop in structured games with global updating
Phase transition and hysteresis loop in structured games with global updating
复制标题
具有全局更新的结构化博弈中的相变和磁滞回线
DOI：
10.1103/physreve.77.046109
复制
发表时间：
2008-04-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Hui, P. M.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wang, Wen-Xu;Lu, Jinhu;Hui, P. M.
提出了一个基于全局支付的策略更新模型，用于研究网络种群的合作行为。我们采用囚徒困境游戏和雪堆游戏的范式来描述个人之间的互动。我们研究了规则，小世界和无标度网络的模型，并发现依赖于初始合作者密度的多稳态合作状态。特别是对于小世界和无标度网络上的雪堆博弈，存在着合作者密度的不连续相变和滞后环。我们解释所观察到的性质的理论预测和模拟结果的平均数量的邻居的合作者和叛逃者，分别。研究表明，邻居数多的个体倾向于保持初始策略，这对邻居数少的个体的策略更新有很大影响;而邻居数少的个体为了避免获得最低收益而不得不成为合作者的事实，对合作策略的维持和传播有重要作用。
We present a global payoff-based strategy updating model for studying cooperative behavior of a networked population. We adopt the Prisoner's Dilemma game and the snowdrift game as paradigms for characterizing the interactions among individuals. We investigate the model on regular, small-world, and scale-free networks, and find multistable cooperation states depending on the initial cooperator density. In particular for the snowdrift game on small-world and scale-free networks, there exist a discontinuous phase transition and hysteresis loops of cooperator density. We explain the observed properties by theoretical predictions and simulation results of the average number of neighbors of cooperators and defectors, respectively. Our work indicates that individuals with more neighbors have a trend to preserve their initial strategies, which has strong impacts on the strategy updating of individuals with fewer neighbors; while the fact that individuals with few neighbors have to become cooperators to avoid gaining the lowest payoff plays significant roles in maintaining and spreading of cooperation strategy.