Expressive Voting : Modeling a Voter ’ s Decision to Vote
Expressive Voting : Modeling a Voter ’ s Decision to Vote
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表达投票：对选民的投票决定进行建模
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发表时间：
2013
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通讯作者：
Dominik Klein
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作者：
Dominik Klein
安东尼·唐斯在其开创性著作《民主的经济理论》中指出了“投票悖论”。在大型选举中，个人投票几乎没有机会对选举结果产生任何影响。因此，面对是否投票的决定，如果投票行为有任何成本，那么选民唯一理性的选择就是不参与。许多投票理论文献都绕过了这个问题，假设投票没有成本，或者“战略”考虑在选民的投票决定中不起作用。参见[5]讨论这个问题的不同方法。然而，还有第二种方法，主要由布伦南和洛马斯基提出，[2]其论证路线大致如下：先验，效用可以与行为的结果或行为本身的执行相关联。为了模拟人类选择行为的许多情况，这两种选择不会产生任何可观察到的行为差异（例如，点葡萄酒A而不是葡萄酒B与喝葡萄酒A而不是葡萄酒B）。因此，揭示性偏好分析已经形成了对基于结果的效用的普遍偏好。然而，在投票的情形中，这两种效用依恋之间却有一个关键的区别，因为投下某种选票并不能保证得到想要的结果，也不可能改变结果。显然，将效用附加到唯一的投票行为避免了“投票悖论”，因为保证了与所做的投票声明相关联的输出效用。介绍一些术语：我们把这种由对结果的效用所引起的投票行为称为工具投票，因为它把选票作为实现某种政治状态的工具。另一方面，由行为上的效用附件所引起的投票行为被称为表达性投票，因为它反映了选民对政党的原始偏好。Brennan和Lomasky [2]认为，关于投票的表达性推理实际上发生了，并在投票行为中发挥了重要作用。可以说，几乎任何关于投票给谁的现实推理都涉及这两个原则的叠加，其中这两个原则之间的相对权重取决于情况的某些方面。因此，在评估不同的投票程序时，需要从工具和表达的角度来分析这些程序的比较。虽然投票的工具方法在决策理论中得到了广泛的研究，但表达投票在比较投票系统中的重要性还没有得到很好的理解。(see[2]分析。在本文中，我们探讨了一个有趣的新方法，这个问题在最近的一篇论文中发现的恩里克塔阿拉贡内斯，伊扎克吉尔博亚和安德鲁韦斯[1]，以下称为AGW方法。他们的模型的基本思想是，议程上有某些事实主题，代理人对各个当事人的利用率是由他们对这些主题的立场得出的。本文的结构如下：在第2段中，我们介绍了Aragnoes，吉尔博亚和韦斯提出的一般模型及其语义
The “paradox of voting” was identified by Anthony Downs in his seminal book An Economic Theory of Democracy [4]. In a large election, there is almost no chance that an individual vote will have any effect on the outcome of the election. Thus, faced with the decision of whether or not to vote, if there is any cost associated with the act of voting, then the only rational choice for a voter is not to participate. Much of the voting theory literature bypasses this problem by assuming that there is no cost to voting or that “strategic” considerations do not play a role in the voters’ decision to vote. See [5] for a discussion of the different approaches to this problem. However there is a second approach, prominently presented by Brennan and Lomasky, [2] whose line of argumentation roughly runs like this: A priori, utility could be associated with the outcome on an action or the performing of the act itsself. For modelling many cases of human choice behaviour these two choices do not make any observable behavioral difference (e.g. in ordering wine A rather than wine B vs. drinking wine A rather than wine B). Consequently, revealed preference analysis has developed a general preference for outcome based utilites. In voting situations however there turns out to be a crucial difference between the two kinds of utility attachments precisely because casting a certain ballot does not guarantee that one gets the desired outcome, nor is it any probable that the outcome changes at all. Obviously, attaching utilities to sole voting acts avoids the ”paradox of voting”, since one is guaranteed to receive the output utility associated with the voting statement made. To introduce some terminology: We call the voting behaviour induced by utilites on the outcome instrumental voting, since it takes the ballot as an instrument to bring about a certain political state. On the other hand, the voting behaviour induced by utility attachments on acts is called expressive voting, since it reflects the voter’s original preferences over parties. Brennan and Lomasky [2] argue that expressive reasoning about voting actually occurs and plays a major role in voting behaviour. Arguably, almost any realistic reasoning about whom to vote involves a superposition of the two principles, where the relative weights between these two depend upon certain aspects of the situation. Thus, in evaluating different voting procedures, one needs to analyze on how these compare from an instrumental as well as an expressive standpoint. While the instrumental approach of voting is widely studied in decision theory, the import of expressive voting in comparing voting systems is not very well understood. (see [2] for some analysis). In this paper, we explore an interesting new approach to this problem found in a recent paper by Enriqueta Aragones, Itzhak Gilboa and Andrew Weiss [1], henceforth called the AGW-approach. The basic idea of their model is that there are certain factual topics on the agenda and the agents’ utilites for the individual parties are derived by their positions on these topics. The structure of the paper is the following: In paragraph 2 we present the general model introduced by Aragnoes, Gilboa and Weiss and their semantics of