Firms’ re-innovation after failure and institutional environment: an evolutionary game theoretical approach
Firms’ re-innovation after failure and institutional environment: an evolutionary game theoretical approach
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DOI：
10.1080/1331677x.2022.2080743
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发表时间：
2022-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Zhuang Xiong;Pengju Wang;Lingling Wang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhuang Xiong;Pengju Wang;Lingling Wang
摘要开展后续创新活动对于激励创新失败的企业提高创新质量和持续竞争力具有重要意义。然而，现有的研究缺乏从制度层面探讨如何激励企业失败后的再创新。为探讨制度环境与企业失败后再创新行为选择之间的关系，探讨了企业失败后再创新的行为特征。运用演化博弈方法构建了政府部门与企业在创新失败情况下的博弈模型。分析了制度环境优化过程中的稳定均衡策略和企业失败后的再创新决策。同时，以郑州市为例，对理论模型进行了说明。研究结果表明，企业对再创新的风险和收益的主观感知影响企业在失败后再创新的行为选择。再创新收益的增加促进了企业失败后的再创新行为，提高了企业的竞争力。知识产权保护水平的提高提高了再创新收益，但再创新成本的降低对企业失败后再创新的行为选择影响有限。政府社会福利的增加促进了制度环境的建设和企业失败后再创新的意愿。
Abstract Carrying out follow-up innovation activities is significant to encourage firms with failed innovation to improve their innovation quality and sustainable competitiveness. However, the existing studies lack discussion on how to stimulate firms’ re-innovation after failure from the institutional level. To explore the relationship between institutional environment and the behavior choice of firms’ re-innovation after failure, the behavior characteristics of firms’ re-innovation after failure were discussed. A game model between government departments and firms with failed innovation was constructed by using the evolutionary game approach. The stable equilibrium strategies in the process of institutional environment optimization and firms’ re-innovation decision-making after failure were analyzed. Meanwhile, the case of Zhengzhou in China was used to illustrate the theoretical model. Results show that the subjective perception of risk and benefit of re-innovation affects the behavior choice of firms’ re-innovation after failure. The increase of re-innovation income promotes re-innovation behavior after failure and enhances firms’ competitiveness. The improvement of intellectual property protection improves re-innovation income, but the reduction of re-innovation cost has a limited impact on the behavior choice of firms’ re-innovation after failure. The increase of government social welfare benefits promotes the institutional environment construction and firms’ willingness to re-innovate after failure.