Immanuel Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Immanuel Kant: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
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伊曼纽尔·康德：任何未来形而上学的序言：任何未来形而上学的序言
DOI：
10.1017/cbo9780511808517.005
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Gary Hatfield
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
I. Kant;Gary Hatfield
首先，关于形而上学认识的来源，它的概念本身就意味着它们不可能是经验的。它的原则（不仅包括它的格言，而且包括它的基本概念）绝不能来自经验。它必须不是物理的，而是形而上的知识，即，知识超越经验。因此，它既不能以作为物理学本身的源泉的外部经验为基础，也不能以作为经验心理学的基础的内部经验为基础。因此，它是一种先验知识，来自纯粹的理解和纯粹的理性。
First, as concerns the sources of metaphysical cognition, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge, viz., knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure Understanding and pure reason.