Noncooperative regulation of a nonlocalized externality
Noncooperative regulation of a nonlocalized externality
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非局部外部性的非合作调节
DOI：
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发表时间：
1985
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Baron
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Baron
在非局部污染外部性下，不同群体承担减排的成本和收益。在酸雨的情况下，这些群体分别是中西部的消费者和东北部的污染者。这些团体有相互冲突的利益，分别由公用事业委员会和环境监管机构代表。我们分析了一个模型，在这个模型中，环境保护署（Environmental Protection Agency）作为冯·斯塔克尔伯格（von Stackelberg）的领导者，监管污染，公用事业委员会为拥有有关其减排替代方案有效性的私人信息的垄断者监管价格。我们描述了非合作均衡，并将其与合作均衡进行了比较。
With a nonlocalized pollution externality, different groups bear the costs and benefits of abatement. In the case of acid rain these groups are, respectively, consumers in the Midwest and pollutees in the Northeast. These groups have conflicting interests that are represented respectively by a public utilities commission and an environmental regulator. We analyze a model in which the Environmental Protection Agency, acting as a von Stackelberg leader, regulates pollution, and the public utility commission regulates the price for a monopolist that has private information about the effectiveness of its abatement alternatives. We characterize a noncooperative equilibrium and compare it with a cooperative equilibrium.