The influence of power and reason on young Maya children's endorsement of testimony
The influence of power and reason on young Maya children's endorsement of testimony
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DOI：
10.1111/desc.12336
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发表时间：
2016-11-01
影响因子：
3.7
通讯作者：
Mercier, Hugo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Castelain, Thomas;Bernard, Stephane;Mercier, Hugo
两个重要的育儿策略是施加自己的力量和使用推理。这些策略对儿童评价证词的影响很少受到关注。使用认知警觉框架，我们预测，当推理线索是足够强大的，它应该克服权力线索。我们在一个人群中测试了这一预测，人类学数据表明，权力是突出的策略，而推理很少依赖于与儿童的互动。在实验1中，4- 6岁的儿童从传统的玛雅人口被证明赞同的证词支持的一个强有力的论点，支持的一个弱的论点。在实验2中，同样的参与者被证明遵循的证词，一个占主导地位的下属。然后，与会者表示赞同的证词下属谁提供了一个强有力的论点，一个占主导地位的人提供了一个弱的论点（实验3）或没有参数（实验4）。因此，当权力和推理线索冲突时，推理完全胜过权力。
Two important parenting strategies are to impose one's power and to use reasoning. The effect of these strategies on children's evaluation of testimony has received very little attention. Using the epistemic vigilance framework, we predict that when the reasoning cue is strong enough it should overcome the power cue. We test this prediction in a population for which anthropological data suggest that power is the prominent strategy while reasoning is rarely relied on in the interactions with children. In Experiment 1, 4- to 6-year-old children from a traditional Maya population are shown to endorse the testimony supported by a strong argument over that supported by a weak argument. In Experiment 2, the same participants are shown to follow the testimony of a dominant over that of a subordinate. The participants are then shown to endorse the testimony of a subordinate who provides a strong argument over that of a dominant who provides either a weak argument (Experiment 3) or no argument (Experiment 4). Thus, when the power and reasoning cues conflict, reasoning completely trumps power.