Burden Sharing and Self-Enforcing Climate Agreements
Burden Sharing and Self-Enforcing Climate Agreements
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DOI：
10.1086/727808
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发表时间：
2023-09
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Shuichi Ohori;Katsunori Ohta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Shuichi Ohori;Katsunori Ohta
这项研究分析了自我执行的气候协议，在重复博弈框架中，不对称国家随着时间的推移排放温室气体。特别是，我们考虑了一种新的负担分担计划，使协议自我执行，即使在一个相对不那么耐心的国家参加了协议。长期稳定的排放配额使协议能够自动执行最大的一组折扣系数，从而使各国的合规门槛相等。然后，我们表明，长期稳定的配额满足祖父作为一个公平的标准时，国家是不对称的。这意味着已经开发出清洁技术的低排放国家将不愿意同意该计划，而投资于适应和棕色技术的国家可能会接受排放配额。此外，过高的目标水平削弱了被允许低减排率的国家的遵约激励措施。
This study analyzes self-enforcing climate agreements in a repeated-game framework in which asymmetric countries emit greenhouse gases over time. In particular, we consider a novel burden-sharing scheme that makes an agreement self-enforcing even when a relatively less patient country participates in the agreement. The long-term stable emission quota that makes the agreement self-enforcing for the largest set of discount factors equalizes the compliance thresholds across countries. We then show that the long-term stable quota satisfies grandfathering as an equity criterion when countries are asymmetric. This implies that low-emitting countries that have developed clean technologies will be reluctant to agree to the scheme, while countries that have invested in adaptation and brown technology are likely to accept the emission quota. Furthermore, an ambitious target level deteriorates the compliance incentives of countries that are allowed to have low emission reduction rates.