Competitive advertising under uncertainty: A stochastic differential game approach
Competitive advertising under uncertainty: A stochastic differential game approach
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DOI：
10.1023/b:jota.0000043996.62867.20
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发表时间：
2004-10-01
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Sethi, SP
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Prasad, A;Sethi, SP
我们分析了双寡头市场中的最优广告支出，每个公司的市场份额取决于自己和竞争对手的广告决策，也受到随机干扰。我们建立了一个广告的微分博弈模型，其中的动态行为是基于Sethi随机广告模型和Lanchester战斗模型。特别值得注意的是，塞西模型中的销售衰减项变成了由竞争性广告和非竞争性流失引起的衰减，在没有广告的情况下，这种衰减会均衡市场份额。我们推导出对称和不对称竞争对手的闭环纳什均衡。对于所有的情况下，明确的解决方案和比较静力学。
We analyze optimal advertising spending in a duopolistic market where each firm's market share depends on its own and its competitor's advertising decisions, and is also subject to stochastic disturbances. We develop a differential game model of advertising in which the dynamic behavior is based on the Sethi stochastic advertising model and the Lanchester model of combat. Particularly important to note is the morphing of the sales decay term in the Sethi model into decay caused by competitive advertising and noncompetitive churn that acts to equalize market shares in the absence of advertising. We derive closed-loop Nash equilibria for symmetric as well as asymmetric competitors. For all cases, explicit solutions and comparative statics are presented.