FUNDING GAPS: A SYMPOSIUM*
FUNDING GAPS: A SYMPOSIUM*
复制标题
资金缺口：研讨会*
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Cressy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Cressy
政府政策的理论和经验基础，以堵塞所谓的商业资金缺口是极具争议的，但很少受到广泛的深入辩论。这场来自该领域主要学者的研讨会提供了一种平衡。讨论的主题包括信息不对称下的借贷理论;其对过度借贷的影响;关系借贷作为信息不对称的市场解决方案;政府对私营部门决策的模仿，以消除高科技股权的不足，并对高科技部门的资金不足进行基于理论的实证工作测试。尽管有非常不同的和潜在的矛盾的贡献，结果是，令人惊讶的是，一套相互同意的政策结论。
Theoretical and empirical foundations of government policies to plug alleged business fundinggaps are highly controversial but rarely subject to wide-ranging in-depth debate. This sympo-sium from major scholars in the field provides a counterbalance. Topics addressed cover thetheory of lending under asymmetric information; its implications for overlending; relationshiplending as a market solution to information asymmetries; government emulation of privatesector decision-making to eliminate underprovision of high tech equity and theoretically-basedempirical work testing for funding deficiencies in the high tech sector. Despite the very dif-ferent and potentially contradictory contributions the result is, surprisingly, a set of mutuallyagreed policy conclusions.