Aspiration dynamics and the sustainability of resources in the public goods dilemma
Aspiration dynamics and the sustainability of resources in the public goods dilemma
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公共物品困境中的愿望动态与资源可持续性
DOI：
10.1016/j.physleta.2016.02.039
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发表时间：
2016-04-01
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Wang, Long
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Du, Jinming;Wu, Bin;Wang, Long
公共不可再生资源的开发利用是一个公共物品困境。个人可以选择限制消耗，以便更长时间地使用资源或消费更多的商品以使自己受益。当资源被耗尽时，对后代不再有任何好处，因此进化过程结束。在这里，我们研究什么机制可以延长资源的使用在进化博弈论的框架下，两个更新规则的基础上模仿和愿望，分别。与模仿过程相比，意愿动态可以延长公共资源的可持续时间。(c)© 2016 Elsevier B.V.版权所有。
How to exploit public non-renewable resources is a public goods dilemma. Individuals can choose to limit the depletion in order to use the resource for a longer time or consume more goods to benefit themselves. When the resource is used up, there is no benefit for the future generations any more, thus the evolutionary process ends. Here we investigate what mechanisms can extend the use of resources in the framework of evolutionary game theory under two updating rules based on imitation and aspiration, respectively. Compared with imitation process, aspiration dynamics may prolong the sustainable time of a public resource. (c) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.