Bank underwriting of corporate bonds evidence from Japan after the financial system reform of 1993
Bank underwriting of corporate bonds evidence from Japan after the financial system reform of 1993
复制标题
1993年金融体系改革后日本银行承销公司债券的证据
DOI：
10.7916/d85x2hfp
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发表时间：
2000
影响因子：
9.8
通讯作者：
T. Hoshi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yasushi Hamao;T. Hoshi
1993年，日本公司债券一级市场发生了重大变化。金融体制改革法案允许银行通过设立证券子公司进入承销业务。本文分析了银行子公司承销的债券与证券公司承销的债券的收益率差异。通过估计一个对自我选择偏差进行修正的回归模型，我们可以区分关于银行承销公司债券对其收益率影响的几个假设。我们发现，投资者会对银行子公司承销的公司债券进行贴现，因为他们怀疑存在利益冲突。另一方面，银行所有的子公司试图通过承销面向机构投资者的债券和由主要银行关系较弱的公司发行的债券来避免这种冲突。尽管投资者对利益冲突的怀疑可能会使银行所有的子公司相对于现有的证券公司处于劣势，但这项研究表明，银行所有的子公司积极的进入战略迄今抵消了这种劣势。鉴于最近《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》被废除，这些调查结果将对观察美国证券业务性质变化的观察者特别感兴趣。
In 1993, the corporate bond primary market in Japan underwent a major change. The Financial System Reform Act allowed banks to enter the underwriting business by setting up securities subsidiaries. This paper analyzes yield differentials between issues underwritten by bank subsidiaries and those underwritten by securities houses. By estimating a regression model with correction for self-selection bias, we can distinguish between several hypotheses concerning the effect of bank underwriting of corporate bonds on their yields. We show that investors discount corporate bonds underwritten by bank-owned subsidiaries because they suspect conflict of interest. Bank-owned subsidiaries, on the other hand, try to avoid this conflict by underwriting bonds intended for institutional investors and bonds issued by firms with weak main bank ties. While investors’ suspicions of conflict of interest may put bank-owned subsidiaries at a disadvantage with respect to incumbent security houses, this study suggests that an aggressive entry strategy on the part of bank-owned subsidiaries has offset the disadvantage so far. In light of the recent repeal of the Glass Steagall Act, these findings will be of particular interest to observers of the changing nature of the securities business in the United States.