Fairness and contract design
Fairness and contract design
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00734.x
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发表时间：
2007-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Schmidt, Klaus M.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fehr, Ernst;Klein, Alexander;Schmidt, Klaus M.
我们在实验上表明，公平性关注可能会对在道德危害背景下的实际和最佳合同选择产生决定性的影响。为令人满意的绩效提供自愿且不可行使的奖金的奖金合同提供了强大的激励措施，并且在有一些志趣相投的参与者时优于明确的激励合同，但是前提付出的信任合同比奖励合同效率低。校长理解这一点，并主要选择奖金合同。这些结果与最近发展的公平理论一致，这些理论为合同选择，公平性和激励措施的相互作用提供了重要的新见解。
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players, but trust contracts that pay a generous wage up front are less efficient than incentive contracts. The principals understand this and predominantly choose the bonus contracts. These results are consistent with recently developed theories of fairness, which offer important new insights into the interaction of contract choices, fairness, and incentives.