Sources of Bureaucratic Influence
Sources of Bureaucratic Influence
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官僚影响力的来源
DOI：
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发表时间：
1984
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
G. Miller
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Michael F. Altfeld;G. Miller
经典的韦伯官僚影响模型强调专业知识是政治权力的源泉。最近的经济模型表明，官僚专业知识源于对投票机构议程的控制。本文区分了这两种类型的官僚影响，并报告了一系列实验，这些实验在同一委员会的决策设置中改变了专业知识的数量和议程控制。初步结果表明，无论是对信息的垄断还是对议程控制的垄断，都可能使外部人士能够影响委员会的选择，而不是委员会本来会赢得多数的替代方案。官僚影响的不同来源是以不同的、可能是相互排斥的方式行使的，因此，这两种垄断并不一定帮助官僚，而不一定只是一种影响本身。原因似乎是，议程控制建立在召集人和委员会之间好斗、讨价还价的关系基础上，而专门知识似乎建立在专家和委员会之间建立专业信任关系的基础上。
Classical Weberian models of bureaucratic influence emphasize expertise as a source of political power. Recent economic models suggest that bureaucratic expertise springs from control over the agenda of voting bodies. This article differentiates the two types of bureaucratic influence and reports on a series of experiments that varies the amount of expertise and agenda control in the same committee decision-making setting. Initial results indicate that either a monopoly on information or a monopoly on agenda control can enable an outsider to influence committee choices away from what would otherwise be the majority winning alternative for the committee. The different sources of bureaucratic influence are exercised in different, possibly mutually exclusive ways, so that both kinds of monopoly do not necessarily help the bureaucrat any more than one kind of influence by itself. The reason seems to be that agenda control is based on a combative, bargaining relationship between the convener and the committee, whereas expertise seems to be based on building a professional relationship of trust between expert and committee.