Negotiating Greece. Layering, insulation, and the design of adjustment programs in the Eurozone
Negotiating Greece. Layering, insulation, and the design of adjustment programs in the Eurozone
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与希腊谈判。
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Moschella
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Moschella
摘要本文旨在解释为什么欧洲央行和欧盟委员会在从第一次调整计划转向第二次调整计划的过程中，放松了对希腊债务重组和财政宽松的反对。使用实证分析的结果，本文表明，欧盟机构的重新定位不能轻易地归因于通常在国际谈判中发挥作用的机制，即外部压力和通过说服新的信念内化。相反，本文认为，一个更细致入微的和完整的解释放松反对改变计划战略需要考虑到的制度和时间层面的三驾马车谈判。具体而言，本文表明，欧洲参与者偏好的演变是由新的危机管理规则分层到货币联盟的机制。分层允许政治行动者在改变的外部环境下实现他们的偏好。
ABSTRACT The paper sets out to explain why the European Central Bank and the European Commission relaxed their opposition to debt restructuring and fiscal accommodation for Greece in the shift from the first to second adjustment program. Using the findings of the empirical analysis, the paper shows that EU institutions’ repositioning cannot easily be ascribed to the mechanisms that are typically at play in international negotiations, namely exogenous pressures and internalization of new beliefs through persuasion. Instead, the paper argues that a more nuanced and complete explanation of the relaxation of opposition to the change in the program strategy requires taking into account the institutional and temporal dimensions of the Troika negotiations. Specifically, the paper shows that the evolution of European actors’ preferences was shaped by the layering of new crisis management rules into the machinery of the monetary union. Layering allowed political actors in favor of the status quo achieving their preferences under changed external circumstances.
历史制度主义和国际关系解释世界政治中的制度发展
DOI：
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198779629.001.0001
发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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作者：
M. (Eds.)
通讯作者：
M. (Eds.)