Incomplete International Climate Agreements: Optimal Carbon Taxes, Market Failures and Welfare Effects*
Incomplete International Climate Agreements: Optimal Carbon Taxes, Market Failures and Welfare Effects*
复制标题
不完整的国际气候协议：最优碳税、市场失灵和福利影响*
DOI：
10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol15-no4-7
复制
发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Bråten
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Golombek;J. Bråten
本文对国际气候协议不完善、合作国家存在市场失灵的情况下的最优碳税和福利效应进行了实证研究。参加国际气候协议的国家集团的目标是设计碳税，在限制全球二氧化碳排放的情况下，最大限度地提高其总净收入。我们使用数值能源模型来研究因二氧化碳税类型和气候协议参与国而异的情景。我们还讨论了不同国际气候协议对区域净收入的影响。
This paper provides an empirical study of optimal carbon taxes and welfare effects under incomplete international climate agreements when there are market failures in the cooperating countries. The objective of the group of countries taking part in the international climate agreement is to design carbon taxes that maximize their aggregate net income, subject to a constraint on global C02 emissions. We use a numerical energy model to study scenarios that differ with respect to types of C02 taxes and countries taking part in the climate agreement. We also discuss the impact on regional net income following from different international climate agreements.