China and India as Emerging Global Governance Actors: Challenges for Developing and Developed Countries
China and India as Emerging Global Governance Actors: Challenges for Developing and Developed Countries
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中国和印度作为新兴的全球治理参与者：发展中国家和发达国家面临的挑战
DOI：
10.1111/j.1759-5436.2006.tb00253.x
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Dirk Messner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Humphrey;Dirk Messner
1 引言 冷战结束时关于全球治理的争论愈演愈烈，反映出人们认识到加速全球化正在产生跨境和全球性问题，而这些问题无法在奉行独立政策的民族国家范围内解决。相反，这些问题需要在“超越民族国家的治理”新形式的基础上从政治上得到解决（Zürn 1998；Rosenau 1997；Nye and Donahue 2000；Kennedy et al. 2002）。国际金融危机、银行监管、全球气候变化、国际产权、移民流动、人道主义干预和打击跨国恐怖主义日益成为全球政策进程的对象，同时也持续关注国际贸易体制等长期存在的问题。在此背景下，全球治理的宗旨和目标被定义为“发展制度和规则体系以及新的国际合作机制，使之能够持续应对全球挑战和跨界现象带来的问题”（Messner 2000：284）。全球治理的主要目标是避免全球体系内出现危机和动荡，越来越多的问题被视为潜在威胁。但全球治理的意义远不止于此：它还有发展目标。在 20 世纪 90 年代的大部分时间里，这些都是新自由主义政策议程，旨在通过内部和外部自由化促进更快的经济增长。日益加强的全球一体化被视为经济增长的积极因素（世界银行，2002），尽管针对“管理全球化”或“让全球化为穷人服务”等问题的讨论日益突出，表明人们认为全球化进程如果要促进包容性发展，就需要在政治上进行管理。 1 20 世纪 90 年代的全球治理话语旨在加强多边世界秩序并在政府和私营部门之间创建新的合作模式。事实上，在这个时期，企业和非政府组织（NGO）在全球治理中变得更加重要。私人和公私组织在各种全球治理机构中变得更加重要，特别是在金融、贸易、劳工和环境标准制定方面（Nadvi 和 Wältring 2004）。 Scholte（2000：151）将私营部门参与者在全球监管活动中发挥越来越大的作用的趋势称为“治理私有化”。 2 然而，多主体、多层次的全球治理体系的出现似乎并没有为发展中国家有效参与全球治理机构创造空间（Rodrik 1997；Maggi 和 Messner 2002）。人们经常评论发展中国家在全球治理机构中的参与和影响力有限。即使在为发展中国家发展理解和能力提供了许多机会的贸易谈判中，也出现了发展中国家制定议程和表明立场能力的最决定性迹象。
1 Introduction The debate on global governance that intensified at the end of the Cold War reflected the recognition that accelerating globalisation was creating crossborder and global problems that could not be solved within the ambit of nation states pursuing go-italone policies. Rather, these problems needed to be tackled politically on the basis of new forms of ‘governance beyond the nation state’(Zürn 1998; Rosenau 1997; Nye and Donahue 2000; Kennedy et al. 2002). International financial crises, banking regulation, global climate change, international property rights, migration flows, humanitarian interventions and the fight against transnational terrorism have increasingly become the objects of global policy processes, along with continued concern with long-established questions such as the international trade regime. The purpose and goals of global governance are defined against this background as the ‘development of a system of institutions and rules as well as of new mechanisms of international cooperation that make it possible to deal on a continuous basis with the problems posed by global challenges and transboundary phenomena’(Messner 2000: 284). The main aim of global governance is to avoid crises and turbulence within the global system, with an increasing range of issues seen as potentially threatening. But global governance amounts to more than this: it also has developmental objectives. For much of the 1990s, these were framed as a neoliberal policy agenda aimed at promoting faster economic growth through internal and external liberalisation. Increasing global integration was seen as a positive factor for economic growth (World Bank 2002), although the increasing salience of discussions addressing issues such as “managing globalisation” or “making globalisation work for the poor” indicated a perception that globalisation processes would need to be managed politically if they were to promote inclusive development. 1 The global governance discourse of the 1990s was geared to strengthening a multilateral world order and creating new patterns of cooperation between governmental and private actors. Indeed, this was the period in which corporations and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) became more prominent in global governance. Private and publicprivate organisations became more important in a variety of global governance institutions, and in particular in standards setting around finance, trade, labour and the environment (Nadvi and Wältring 2004). Scholte (2000: 151) refers to the trend of private sector actors playing an increasing role in regulatory activities at the global level as the “privatisation of governing”. 2 Nevertheless, the emergence of a multi-actor, multilevel global governance system did not appear to create space for effective participation by developing countries in global governance institutions (Rodrik 1997; Maggi and Messner 2002). The limited participation and influence of developing countries in global governance institutions is often remarked upon. Even in trade negotiations, which have provided many opportunities for developing countries to develop understanding and capabilities, the most decisive indication of developing country capacity to frame agendas and stake out positions occurred