Centre De Referència En Economia Analítica Barcelona Economics Working Paper Series License Prices for Financially Constrained Firms License Prices for Financially Constrained Firms
Centre De Referència En Economia Analítica Barcelona Economics Working Paper Series License Prices for Financially Constrained Firms License Prices for Financially Constrained Firms
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巴塞罗那经济分析参考中心经济工作论文系列 财务受限企业的许可价格 财务受限企业的许可价格
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通讯作者：
R. P. McAfee
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作者：
Roberto Burguet;R. P. McAfee
人们经常声称高拍卖价格抑制了服务部署。我们在投标人资金紧张的极端情况下调查了这一说法。如果需求仅有轻微弹性，如果消费者剩余是数量的凸函数（常见假设），或者如果消费者剩余是凹函数并且用于部署的支出比例大于需求弹性的一倍，则拍卖会最大化消费者剩余。后一种情况似乎适用于美国和欧洲的大多数大型电信拍卖。因此，即使高拍卖价格抑制了服务部署，从消费者的角度来看，拍卖似乎也是最优的。 “这是消费主义和常识的胜利。”爱尔兰监管机构 ComReg（当时的电信监管机构）主任 Etain Doyle 对通过“选美比赛”颁发 3G 爱尔兰牌照的决定发表评论。
It is often alleged that high auction prices inhibit service deployment. We investigate this claim under the extreme case of financially constrained bidders. If demand is just slightly elastic, auctions maximize consumer surplus if consumer surplus is a convex function of quantity (a common assumption), or if consumer surplus is concave and the proportion of expenditure spent on deployment is greater than one over the elasticity of demand. The latter condition appears to be true for most of the large telecom auctions in the US and Europe. Thus, even if high auction prices inhibit service deployment, auctions appear to be optimal from the consumers' point of view. "It is a victory for consumerism and common sense." Etain Doyle, Director of Ireland's regulator ComReg (then Telecommunications Regulation), commenting the decision to award 3G Irish licenses through a "beauty contest".