"I Am Who I Am": On the Perceived Threats to Personal Identity from Deep Brain Stimulation
"I Am Who I Am": On the Perceived Threats to Personal Identity from Deep Brain Stimulation
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DOI：
10.1007/s12152-011-9137-1
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发表时间：
2013-12-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Baylis, Francoise
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Baylis, Francoise
本文探讨了脑深部电刺激（DBS）后错位的自我的概念，并得出结论，当个人身份被理解为动态的，叙事的，和关系的条款，声称DBS是一个威胁个人身份是深有问题的。虽然DBS可能导致行为、情绪和认知（与人格密切相关的特征）的深刻变化，但将DBS描述为威胁个人身份是没有帮助的，因为这种说法要么是错误的，误导的，要么是微不足道的。这种主张是错误的，因为它否定了身份形成的动态性质。就个人身份所面临的真实的威胁是其他人对肢体残疾和其他残疾人的歧视态度而言，这一主张是对DBS的误导。这种说法是平凡的真实，因为任何戏剧性的事件或经验融入一个人的身份构成叙事，然后可能被描述为威胁。从关系个人身份的角度来看，当DBS戏剧性地扰乱叙事流时，这种扰乱最好通过代理的透镜来检验。为了说明的目的，重点是DBS治疗帕金森病。
This article explores the notion of the dislocated self following deep brain stimulation (DBS) and concludes that when personal identity is understood in dynamic, narrative, and relational terms, the claim that DBS is a threat to personal identity is deeply problematic. While DBS may result in profound changes in behaviour, mood and cognition (characteristics closely linked to personality), it is not helpful to characterize DBS as threatening to personal identity insofar as this claim is either false, misdirected or trivially true. The claim is false insofar as it misunderstands the dynamic nature of identity formation. The claim is misdirected at DBS insofar as the real threat to personal identity is the discriminatory attitudes of others towards persons with motor and other disabilities. The claim is trivially true insofar as any dramatic event or experience integrated into one's identity-constituting narrative could then potentially be described as threatening. From the perspective of relational personal identity, when DBS dramatically disrupts the narrative flow, this disruption is best examined through the lens of agency. For illustrative purposes, the focus is on DBS for the treatment of Parkinson's disease.