Public Goods With Punishment and Abstaining in Finite and Infinite Populations
Public Goods With Punishment and Abstaining in Finite and Infinite Populations
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DOI：
10.1162/biot.2008.3.2.114
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发表时间：
2008-03-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sigmund, Karl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hauert, Christoph;Traulsen, Arne;Sigmund, Karl
人类和动物社会中合作的进化和维持挑战了从进化生物学到人类学、社会科学和经济学的各种学科。在社会互动中，合作者以自己为代价增加了群体的福利，而背叛者则试图搭便车，既不提供利益，也不承担成本。当互动个体的数量增加时，合作问题变得更加突出。惩罚和自愿参与已被确定为支持合作和防止作弊的可能因素。通常情况下，惩罚行为无法在群体中站稳脚跟，而志愿服务本身可以有效地防止相互背叛状态下的僵局，但无法稳定合作。这两种机制的组合效应在有限和无限种群中产生了令人惊讶的不同后果。在这里，我们提供了一个详细的比较这两种情况下，并证明了有限的人口的内在随机性的驱动下，从社会互动弃权的可能性起着关键作用，这为建立合作和惩罚铺平了道路。
The evolution and maintenance of cooperation in human and animal societies challenge various disciplines ranging from evolutionary biology to anthropology, social sciences, and economics. In social interactions, cooperators increase the welfare of the group at some cost to themselves whereas defectors attempt to free ride and neither provide benefits nor incur costs. The problem of cooperation becomes even more pronounced when increasing the number of interacting individuals. Punishment and voluntary participation have been identified as possible factors to support cooperation and prevent cheating. Typically, punishment behavior is unable to gain a foothold in a population, while volunteering alone can efficiently prevent deadlocks in states of mutual defection but is unable to stabilize cooperation. The combined effects of the two mechanisms have surprisingly different consequences in finite and infinite populations. Here we provide a detailed comparison of the two scenarios and demonstrate that driven by the inherent stochasticity of finite populations, the possibility to abstain from social interactions plays a pivotal role, which paves the way for the establishment of cooperation and punishment.