Investigating the Robustness of the Illusory Truth Effect Across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style
Investigating the Robustness of the Illusory Truth Effect Across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style
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DOI：
10.1177/0146167219853844
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发表时间：
2020-02-01
影响因子：
4
通讯作者：
Roets, Arne
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
De keersmaecker, Jonas;Dunning, David;Roets, Arne
人们更倾向于相信信息是真实的，如果他们以前遇到过它。关于这种虚幻的真理效应是否受到个体认知差异的影响，我们知之甚少。在七项研究(综合N=2,196)中，我们使用琐碎的陈述(研究1-6)和党派新闻标题(研究7)，通过三个已被证明在认知过程中起关键作用的因素来调查缓和：认知能力(研究1，2，5)，认知封闭的需要(研究1)，以及认知风格，即依赖直觉思维与分析思维(研究1，3-7)。所有研究都显示了一种显著的虚假真相效应，但在所有研究中，没有证据表明任何认知指标都是适度的。这些结果表明，虚幻真理效应对认知能力、认知闭合需要和认知风格的个体差异具有较强的稳健性。
People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.