License and entry strategies for an outside innovator under duopoly with combination of royalty and fixed fee
License and entry strategies for an outside innovator under duopoly with combination of royalty and fixed fee
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双寡头垄断下外部创新者的许可和进入策略，结合特许权使用费和固定费用
DOI：
10.1007/s10842-018-0269-4
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yasuhito Tanaka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Masahiko Hattori;Yasuhito Tanaka
我们考虑创新公司进入市场的选择，无论是否将其新的降低成本的技术许可给现有公司，使用特许权使用费和固定许可费的组合，或者在不进入的情况下许可其技术。当创新公司将其技术许可给现有公司而无需进入时，创新公司的最佳特许权使用费为零。当创新公司获得许可进入市场时，其最佳特许权使用费率为正。在这种情况下，如果成本函数是凹的，则最优特许权使用费率是现有公司以负固定费用退出市场，并且无进入策略的许可和有许可策略的进入是最优的；如果成本函数是严格凸的，则存在正最优特许权使用费率与正或负固定费用的内部解决方案，并且许可策略的进入是最优的。
We consider a choice of options for an innovating firm to enter the market with or without licensing its new cost-reducing technology to an incumbent firm using a combination of royalty and fixed license fee, or to license its technology without entry. When the innovating firm licenses its technology to the incumbent firm without entry, the optimal royalty rate for the innovating firm is zero. When the innovating firm enters the market with a license, its optimal royalty rate is positive. In that case if cost functions are concave, the optimal royalty rate is one such that the incumbent firm drops out of the market with negative fixed fee, and license without entry strategy and entry with license strategy are optimal; if cost functions are strictly convex, there is an internal solution of positive optimal royalty rate with positive or negative fixed fee and entry with license strategy is optimal.