Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: A model for the selection and use of biased expert advice
Information transfer and aggregation in an uninformed committee: A model for the selection and use of biased expert advice
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不知情的委员会中的信息传输和聚合：选择和使用有偏见的专家建议的模型
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2491776
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Morgan Llewellyn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Plott;Morgan Llewellyn
一个由五人组成的委员会使用多数规则来决定两个公共产品。个别委员会成员的偏好取决于委员会成员不知道的自然状态，但对委员会决策有偏好的两位专家知道自然状态。专家对委员会没有投票权，但在会议开始时向委员会提出建议。选择了两位知道相反偏见的专家--这是一种二元机制。结果表明，专家并不说实话，但委员会的决定就像委员会成员知道专家所知道的一样。信息传递的发生是因为委员会成员预测到了偏见，并适当地推断了专家持有的信息。
A committee of five uses majority rule for decisions on two public goods. Individual committee member preferences depend on a state of nature that is unknown to the committee members but the state of nature is known to two experts who have preferences about committee decisions. Experts have no vote on the committee but provide a recommendation to the committee at the opening of a meeting. Two experts who have known, opposing biases are selected – a dyadic mechanism. The results reveal that experts do not tell the truth but committee decisions are as if committee members know what the experts know. The information transfer occurs because committee members anticipate the biases and properly infer the information held by the experts.