Bargaining over a common categorisation
Bargaining over a common categorisation
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就共同的分类进行讨价还价
作者：
M. LiCalzi;Nadia Maagli
两个被赋予不同分类的代理人进行讨价还价，以达成谅解，并就共同的分类达成一致。我们将这个过程建模为一个简单的非合作博弈，并展示了三个结果。当最初的分歧集中时，谈判过程就有了零和结构。当分歧广泛存在时，零和结构消失，唯一的均衡需要共识的撤回：两个单独将一个地区与同一类别联系起来的代理人最终将其重新命名为不同的类别。最后，我们表明，这最后的均衡结果是帕累托主导的合作解决方案，避免收回，也就是说，唯一的均衡协议可能是低效的。
Two agents endowed with different categorisations engage in bargaining to reach an understanding and agree on a common categorisation. We model the process as a simple non-cooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum structure. When the disagreement is widespread, the zero-sum structure disappears and the unique equilibrium requires a retraction of consensus: two agents who individually associate a region with the same category end up rebranding it under a different category. Finally, we show that this last equilibrium outcome is Pareto dominated by a cooperative solution that avoids retraction; that is, the unique equilibrium agreement may be inefficient.