Choosing Price or Quantity? The Role of Delegation and Network Externalities in a Mixed Duopoly
Choosing Price or Quantity? The Role of Delegation and Network Externalities in a Mixed Duopoly
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选择价格还是数量？
DOI：
10.1111/1467-8454.12079
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发表时间：
2017
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Nakamura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jin-Li Hu;Satoshi Honma;and Hsiao-Ping Hsieh;本間聡;本間聡;Satoshi Honma;Satoshi Honma;本間聡;Satoshi Honma;本間聡;Kiyoshi Matsubara;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura;Yasuhiko Nakamura
本文考虑了由一个社会福利最大化的公共企业和一个利润最大化的私人企业组成的差异化产品管理混合双寡头垄断。我们建立了战略契约的企业选择模型。我们发现，当网络效应的强度足够强时，价格竞争可以成为唯一的均衡市场结构。此外，我们还证明了存在一个产品差异化程度和网络效应强度的区域，使得上市公司选择价格契约而私人公司选择数量契约的情况可以成为唯一的均衡结构。
This paper considers a differentiated goods managerial mixed duopoly composed of one social welfare‐maximising public firm and one profit‐maximising private firm. We model the firm choice of the strategic contract. We find that when the strength of network effects is sufficiently strong, the price competition can become the unique equilibrium market structure. Furthermore, we show that there exists an area of the degree of product differentiation and the strength of network effects such that the situation wherein the public firm chooses its price contract whereas the private firm chooses its quantity contract can become the unique equilibrium structure.