MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND OPTIMAL FINANCING POLICIES
MANAGERIAL DISCRETION AND OPTIMAL FINANCING POLICIES
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DOI：
10.1016/0304-405x(90)90011-n
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发表时间：
1990-07-01
影响因子：
8.9
通讯作者：
STULZ, RM
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
STULZ, RM
我分析了一家由原子股东拥有的公司的融资政策，这些股东既不观察现金流，也不观察管理层的投资决策。管理层从投资中获取额外津贴，并尽可能多地进行投资。由于它总是声称现金流量太低，为所有正净现值项目提供资金，因此当现金流量确实很低时，它的说法并不可信。因此，管理层被迫在现金流量较低时投资过少，而在现金流量较高时选择投资过多。融资政策通过影响管理层控制下的资源，可以降低投资过度和投资不足的成本。
I analyze financing policies in a firm owned by atomistic shareholders who observe neither cash flows nor management's investment decisions. Management derives perquisites from investment and invests as much as possible. Since it always claims that cash flow is too low fund all positive net present value projects, its claim is not credible when cash flow is truly low. Consequently, management is forced to invest too little when cash flow is low and chooses to invest too much when it is high. Financing policies, by influencing the resources under management's control, can reduce the costs of over- and underinvestment.