Technical Note - Nonlinear Pricing Competition with Private Capacity Information
Technical Note - Nonlinear Pricing Competition with Private Capacity Information
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技术说明 - 具有私人容量信息的非线性定价竞争
DOI：
10.1287/opre.2015.1463
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Perakis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hamid Nazerzadeh;G. Perakis
分析了两个能力受限的供应商和一个零售商的不完全信息博弈均衡。每个供应商的能力是她的私人信息。供应商在各自能力的限制下，同时非合作地向零售商提供数量-价格计划。然后，零售商决定从每个供应商购买的数量，以最大化自己的效用。我们证明了这个游戏的（纯策略）纳什均衡的存在。我们表明，在均衡的每个（无穷小）单位的供应被分配一个边际价格是独立的能力，只依赖于零售商的估值函数和能力的分布。此外，具有较大容量的供应商出售其所有供应。
We analyze the equilibrium of an incomplete information game consisting of two capacity-constrained suppliers and a single retailer. The capacity of each supplier is her private information. Conditioned on their capacities, the suppliers simultaneously and noncooperatively offer quantity-price schedules to the retailer. Then, the retailer decides on the quantities to purchase from each supplier to maximize his own utility. We prove the existence of a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium for this game. We show that at the equilibrium each (infinitesimal) unit of the supply is assigned a marginal price that is independent of the capacities and depends only on the valuation function of the retailer and the distribution of the capacities. In addition, the supplier with the larger capacity sells all her supply.