Fully Deniable Interactive Encryption

Fully Deniable Interactive Encryption
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完全可否认的交互式加密

DOI:
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发表时间:
2020
期刊:
Annual International Cryptology Conference
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Oxana Poburinnaya
Oxana Poburinnaya
中科院分区:
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文献类型:
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作者:
R. Canetti;Sunoo Park;Oxana Poburinnaya

文献摘要

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可否认加密(卡内蒂等人,1996年密码学会议)增强了公共信道上的秘密通信,提供了额外的保障,即即使各方后来被胁迫(或自愿被收买)暴露其全部内部状态:明文、密钥和随机性,通信的保密性也能得到保护。到目前为止,可否认加密的构造——更广泛地说,交互式可否认通信——仅针对只有一方被攻破的受限情况(萨海和沃特斯,2014年美国计算机协会计算理论年会)。如果双方同时被胁迫,可否认通信是否完全可能这一主要问题仍然悬而未决。
Deniable encryption (Canetti et al., Crypto 1996) enhances secret communication over public channels, providing the additional guarantee that the secrecy of communication is protected even if the parties are later coerced (or willingly bribed) to expose their entire internal states: plaintexts, keys and randomness. To date, constructions of deniable encryption—and more generally, interactive deniable communication—only address restricted cases where only one party is compromised (Sahai and Waters, STOC 2014). The main question—whether deniable communication is at all possible if both parties are coerced at once—has remained open.