Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks.
Reputation-based partner choice promotes cooperation in social networks.
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DOI：
10.1103/physreve.78.026117
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发表时间：
2008-08
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Wang L
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Fu F;Hauert C;Nowak MA;Wang L
研究了个体策略演化与个体伙伴关系演化相互作用下的合作动态。我们关注声誉对个体伴侣转换过程的影响。我们假设个人可以通过模仿他们的合作伙伴来改变他们的策略，或者根据当地的声誉信息来调整他们的合作关系。我们通过两种方式操纵合作伙伴的转换，即个体可以从声誉最低的合作伙伴切换到声誉最高的合作伙伴（即合作顺序）或从整个群体中随机选择的其他伙伴（即合作随机性）。我们的研究表明，当个体能够在声誉的基础上改变他们的行为策略和社会互动伙伴关系时，合作就会占上风。我们发现，背叛的诱惑越大，合作伙伴网络越密集，个体就越需要频繁地改变他们的伙伴关系，以使合作蓬勃发展。此外，转向合作伙伴的合作伙伴的趋势增加，更有可能导致更高的合作水平。我们发现，在这种伙伴转换过程中，当声誉缺失时，合作远不如声誉参与时更受青睐。此外，我们还研究了个体声誉折现对合作演化的影响。我们的研究结果强调了当个人可以调整他们的伙伴关系时，考虑声誉（间接互惠）对促进合作的重要性。
We investigate the cooperation dynamics attributed to the interplay between evolution of individual strategies and evolution of individual partnerships. We focus on the effect of reputation on individual's partner switching process. We assume individuals can either change their strategies by imitating their partners or adjust their partnerships based on local information about reputations. We manipulate the partner switching in two ways, that is, individuals can switch from the lowest reputation partners, either to their partners' partners who have the highest reputation (i.e., ordering in partnership) or to others randomly chosen from the entire population (i.e., randomness in partnership). We show that when individuals are able to alter their behavioral strategies and their social interaction partnerships on the basis of reputation, cooperation can prevail. We find that the larger temptation to defect and the denser the partner network, the more frequently individuals need shift their partnerships in order for cooperation to thrive. Furthermore, increasing tendency of switching to partners' partners is more likely to lead to higher level of cooperation. We show that when reputation is absent in such partner-switching process, cooperation is much less favored than that of reputation involved. Moreover, we investigate the effect of discounting individual's reputation on the evolution of cooperation. Our results highlight the importance of consideration of reputation (indirect reciprocity) on promotion of cooperation when individuals can adjust their partnerships.