Politically Allocated Land Rights and the Geography of Electoral Violence
Politically Allocated Land Rights and the Geography of Electoral Violence
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政治分配的土地权和选举暴力的地理分布
DOI：
10.1177/0010414011407465
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Catherine Boone
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Catherine Boone
政治理论和政治经济学的大量文献认为，私有财产制度通过限制多数主义政治、降低选举的风险和保护“基本”或少数人的权利，有助于支持自由选举制度。这篇文章探讨了这种争论对撒哈拉以南非洲选举的影响，这是一个以农村为主的大陆，只有2%到10%的农村财产（按国家划分）属于私人所有。非洲的农村财产制度是否影响了选举动态，如果是，是哪些，又是如何影响的？本文考察了肯尼亚的情况，重点关注1991-1992年农村地区的选举动态，在这些地区，国家本身对土地分配行使直接特权。我们表明，在这些地区，政治家操纵土地权利来动员支持者和惩罚反对者。他们这样做的方式直接导致了选举期间与土地有关的广泛暴力。对其他非洲案例的引用有助于概括和设定论点的范围条件。
Large literatures in political theory and political economy argue that private property regimes help support liberal electoral regimes by constraining majoritarian politics, lowering the stakes of elections, and protecting “fundamental” or minority rights. This article probes implications of this argument for elections in sub-Saharan Africa, a mostly rural continent where only about 2% to 10% of all rural property (by country) is held under private title. Do Africa’s rural property regimes shape electoral dynamics and, if so, which ones, and how? This article examines the case of Kenya, focusing on 1991-1992 electoral dynamics in rural zones in which the state itself has exercised direct prerogative over land allocation. We show that in these zones, politicians manipulated land rights to mobilize supporters and punish opponents. They did so in ways that contributed directly to widespread land-related violence at election time. References to other African cases help generalize and set scope conditions on the argument.