Airline alliances and entry deterrence
Airline alliances and entry deterrence
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DOI：
10.1016/j.tre.2007.05.003
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发表时间：
2008-07
影响因子：
10.6
通讯作者：
M. Lin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Lin
本文研究了代码共享联盟在进入威慑中的作用。一家主要航空公司运营着一个网络，有一个枢纽连接n个城市。它与另一家外国航空公司在一个国际辐条上竞争，而其他辐条是国内的，并且是垄断的。在国内的一条轮辐上存在一个潜在的进入者。我们证明，进入可能增加或减少主要运营商的利润，这取决于网络规模和产品差异化的程度。当进入降低利润时，现任者之间的联盟可以被用作一种可信的威胁，以威慑没有显著成本优势的进入者。
This paper investigates the role of code-sharing alliances on entry deterrence. One major carrier operates a network with one hub that links n cities. It competes with another foreign carrier on one international spoke, while the other spokes are domestic and monopolized. There exists a potential entrant on one of the domestic spokes. We demonstrate that entry may increase or decrease the major carrier’s profits, depending on the network size and the degree of product differentiation. When entry decreases the profits, an alliance between incumbents can be used as a credible threat to deter entrants with no significant cost advantage.