A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues
A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03591.x
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发表时间：
1982-09
影响因子：
8
通讯作者：
D. Baron
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Baron
本文提出了一种投资银行咨询和分销服务需求理论，适用于投资银行家比发行人更了解资本市场，而发行人无法观察到银行家所付出的分销努力的情况。将要约价格决策委托给消息灵通的银行家的最优合约，以解决信息不对称和可观察性问题引起的逆向选择和道德风险问题。该模型显示了对投资银行咨询和分销服务的积极需求，并解释了新股定价过低的原因。投资银行家履行对新证券发行人可能有价值的三项职能：承销、咨询和分销。本文提出了一种基于新证券发行人和投资银行家之间信息不对称的投资银行咨询和分销服务需求理论。最终，需要一种金融中介行业组织理论来预测哪些公司将出于何种目的而使用哪种类型的金融中介，以及哪些公司将在不使用金融中介服务的情况下筹集资金。这里仅在谈判合同下的固定价格发行模型的背景下开发了有限的一组此类预测，其中投资银行家是
This paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer, and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker. The optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better-informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized. The model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues. AN INVESTMENT BANKER PERFORMS three functions which may be of value to an issuer of new securities: underwriting, advising, and distribution. This paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services based on an informational asymmetry between an issuer of new securities and an investment banker. Ultimately, a theory of the organization of the financial intermediary industry is required that would predict which firms would use which types of financial intermediaries for which purposes, and which firms would raise capital without engaging the services of a financial intermediary. Only a limited set of such predictions are developed here in the context of a model of a fixedprice offering under a negotiated contract in which the investment banker is