Critical heuristics of social systems design
Critical heuristics of social systems design
复制标题
社会系统设计的批判性启发
DOI：
10.1007/978-1-4613-0789-1_9
复制
发表时间：
1987
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
W. Ulrich
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Ulrich
应用学科的东西，如OR/MS，是认识论者所谓的“应用的背景”，以区别于所谓的“证明的背景”。认识论学者如卡尔·R.波普尔（Popper，1961，1968，1972）认为，科学应用的背景与其命题的合理性无关。为了与这一立场相区别，我建议将应用科学理解为--实际上是将其定义为--对应用背景的研究。当然，这一定义使这两种情况之间的区别变得过时。从应用科学的观点来看，这种区别确实是相当不充分的：证明应用科学的命题是正当的，只能意味着证明它对所研究的应用环境的影响是正当的。与基础科学相比，使应用科学如此难以证明的关键问题在于其命题在应用背景下获得的规范性内容。
The stuff of applied disciplines such as OR/MS is what epistemologists call the ’context of application’, in distinction to the so-called ’context of justification’. Epistemologists such as Karl R. Popper (1961, 1968, 1972) have claimed that the context in which science is applied is relatively irrelevant for the justification of its propositions. In distinction to this position, I propose to understand — and indeed define — applied science as the study of contexts of application. Of course this definition renders the distinction between the two contexts obsolete. From an applied- science point of view, the distinction is really quite inadequate: To justify the propositions of applied science can only mean to justify its effects upon the context of application under study. The key problem that makes applied science, as compared to basic science, so difficult to justify lies in the normative content that its propositions gain in the context of application.