Competition for influence in mixed oligopoly
Competition for influence in mixed oligopoly
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发表时间：
2019
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通讯作者：
Isidoro Mazza;M. Kunizaki
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作者：
Isidoro Mazza;M. Kunizaki
本文的目的是在一个封闭的和两个国家的混合寡头垄断模型中分析政治游说对最优私有化程度的影响。我们发现，在一般情况下，游说活动不会导致帕累托有效配置的最优私有化政策在一个封闭的两个国家的模型。这与共同代理人游说模型和多代理人游说模型的结果形成了鲜明的对比。JEL分类：D43; D 72; F12; F13; L33
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of political lobbying on the degree of optimal privatization ratio in a closed and a two-country, mixed oligopoly model. We find that, in general, lobbying activity does not lead to a Pareto efficient allocation by optimal privatization policy in a closed and a two-country model. This is sharply contrast result in a common-agent and a multi-agent lobbying model. JEL Classification: D43; D72; F12; F13; L33