The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem
The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem
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信仰的务实理由的可能性和错误的理由问题
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
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通讯作者：
A. Reisner
中科院分区：
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作者：
A. Reisner
在这篇文章中，我反对关于信仰的是非理由的两种观点中较强的一种，即认为信仰的唯一真正的规范性理由是证据的观点。本文中的项目主要是消极的，但最终目标是积极的。这一目标是为了给这样一种可能性留出空间，即有真正的务实理由让人相信。需要为这一观点腾出空间，因为在关于信仰的规范性理由的许多辩论中，严格的各种证据主义仍然是默认的观点。严格的证据主义版本与这样一种观点不一致，即信仰有真正的实用理由。
In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.