Vendettas
Vendettas
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DOI：
10.1257/mic.6.2.93
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发表时间：
2014-05-01
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
Zizzo, Daniel John
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bolle, Friedel;Tan, Jonathan H. W.;Zizzo, Daniel John
仇杀发生在许多现实世界中，竞争对手通过采取咄咄逼人的报复行为来争夺奖品，例如，赢得竞争性晋升或保住一份工作。我们提出了一个基准实验，其中两个玩家有初始的获奖概率。报复性的仇杀会发生，并在三分之二的情况下导致受试者出现最糟糕的结果，这与利己主义的预测背道而驰，即使在没有从侵略中立即获得任何好处的情况下，效率也很低。负面情绪很重要，并与经济环境相互作用，产生巨大的社会低效。允许冷静期可以减少攻击性。
Vendettas occur in many real-world settings where rivals compete for a prize, e.g., winning a competitive promotion or retaining a job, by engaging in aggressive, retaliatory behavior. We present a benchmark experiment where two players have an initial probability of winning a prize. Retaliatory vendettas occur and lead subjects to the worst possible outcomes in 2/3 of cases, counter to self-interest predictions, with large inefficiencies even in the absence of any immediate gain from aggression. Negative emotions are important and interact with the economic setting to produce large social inefficiencies. Allowing cooling off periods reduces aggression.