Signalling, Agency Theory and Accounting Policy Choice
Signalling, Agency Theory and Accounting Policy Choice
复制标题
信号、代理理论和会计政策选择
DOI：
10.1080/00014788.1987.9729347
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发表时间：
1987
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Richard Morris
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Richard Morris
抽象的信号传递理论和代理理论在会计文献中似乎是相互竞争的理论。本文证明了它们实际上是一致的理论，因为信号传递理论的一组充分条件至少与代理理论的一组充分条件一致。事实上，这两种理论之间存在着相当大的重叠：理性行为是两者共同的；信号传递理论中的信息不对称，隐含在代理理论中的正监控成本；信号传递理论中的“质量”可以用代理理论变量来定义；信号传递成本隐含在代理理论的一些绑定机制中。文中给出了两种理论关于游说、会计选择和自愿选择审计师的预测相加的例子。
Abstract Signalling and agency theories appear in the accounting literature to be competing theories. This article demonstrates that they are actually consistent theories, in that one set of sufficient conditions of signalling theory is at least consistent with one set of sufficient conditions of agency theory. Indeed, a considerable overlap exists between the two theories: rational behaviour is common to both; information asymmetry in signalling theory is implied by positive monitoring costs in agency theory; ‘quality' in signalling theory can be defined in terms of agency theory variables; and signalling costs are implicit in some bonding devices of agency theory. Examples are given where both theories’ predictions about lobbying, accounting choices, and voluntary auditor selection are added together.