Production lot-sizing and carbon emissions under cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations
Production lot-sizing and carbon emissions under cap-and-trade and carbon tax regulations
复制标题
限额与交易和碳税法规下的生产批量和碳排放
DOI：
10.1016/j.jclepro.2014.08.102
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发表时间：
2015-09-15
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Bian, Yiwen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
He, Ping;Zhang, Wei;Bian, Yiwen
碳排放限额交易和碳税是两种被广泛采用的限制企业碳排放的排放法规。本文基于经济订货批量模型，分别研究了两种制度下企业的生产批量问题。得到了两种法规下的最优批量和排放量。然后，我们调查的最佳批量和排放量的生产和监管参数的影响。此外，我们比较了两种法规下企业的最优碳排放量。研究发现，在总量管制与交易制度下，企业的最优排放决策和许可证交易决策取决于不同的许可证交易价格。如果设置产生的成本与持有产生的每单位排放量相同，则两种法规总是导致相同的最佳排放量（这也等于没有排放法规）。否则，任何一项法规都不会导致比另一项法规更低的排放量。(C)2014爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
Cap-and-trade and carbon tax are two emission regulations widely used to curb the carbon emissions generated from firms. Based on economic order quantity (EOQ) model, this paper examines the production lot-sizing issues of a firm under these two regulations, respectively. The optimal lot-size and emissions under the two regulations are achieved. We then investigate the impacts of production and regulation parameters on the optimal lot-size and emissions. Furthermore, we compare the firm's optimal carbon emissions under the two regulations. It is found that under the cap-and-trade regulation, the firm's decisions of the optimal emissions as well as permits trading depend on the differentiated permits trading prices. If setup incurs the same cost as holding incurs per unit of generated emissions, both regulations always lead to the same optimal emissions (which is also equal to that without emission regulation). Otherwise, neither regulation always leads to lower emissions than the other does. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.