Science and Sensibilia by W. V. Quine - The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures
Science and Sensibilia by W. V. Quine - The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures
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科学与感性 作者：W. V. Quine - 1980 年伊曼努尔·康德讲座
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-030-04909-6_10
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Janssen-Lauret F
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Janssen-Lauret F
奎因关于本体论和自然主义的观点是众所周知的，但很少被同时考虑。根据我的解释，它们之间的联系至关重要。我把奎因看做一个全球认识论的结构主义者。奎因认为，我们只知道关于观察中重要交叉点的谜题的对象解。在我们最好的理论中，对象总是通过它们的角色被描述性地访问的。奎因的康德演讲包含了早期版本的认识论结构主义，带有关于心理的不同寻常的评论。在这里，奎因拥抱了缓和的异常一元论，允许内省和原则上对知觉事件的完整物理描述的可用性。后来的版本摒弃了这些想法。我的认知结构解释解释了其中的原因。我认为，以第一人称内省的方式接触精神状态与全球认识论结构主义是不相容的。
Quine’s views on ontology and naturalism are well-known but rarely considered in tandem. According to my interpretation the connection between them is vital. I read Quine as a global epistemic structuralist. Quine thought we only ever know objectsquasolutions to puzzles about significant intersections in observations. Objects are always accessed descriptively, via their roles in our best theory. Quine’s Kant lectures contain an early version of epistemic structuralism with uncharacteristic remarks about the mental. Here Quine embraces mitigated anomalous monism, allowing introspection and the availability in principle of full physical descriptions of perceptual events. Later versions abandon these ideas. My epistemic-structural interpretation explains why. I argue first-person introspective access to mental states is incompatible with global epistemic structuralism.