The Constitutionalization of Indigenous Group Rights, Traditional Political Institutions, and Customary Law
The Constitutionalization of Indigenous Group Rights, Traditional Political Institutions, and Customary Law
复制标题
DOI：
10.1177/0010414018774347
复制
发表时间：
2019-10-01
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
Neupert-Wentz, Clara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Holzinger, Katharina;Haer, Roos;Neupert-Wentz, Clara
世界上许多国家的宪法都载有关于土著社区的特别规定，赋予他们特别权利，并规范他们的传统政治机构和习惯法。基于理性的宪法制定理论，我们采用了一个需求和供给框架来解释这些条款的宪法化。为了验证我们的假设，我们对193个联合国成员国现行宪法中的土著条款进行了编码。我们发现，充分的民主和以前的冲突促使纳入土著群体的权利，而不是习惯法和传统机构。习惯法和传统体制在族裔高度分化的国家更有可能宪法化。现代化程度低尤其影响到传统政治体制的宪法化，而发展水平低则与习惯法条款有关。前英国殖民地更有可能将习惯法宪法化。
Many constitutions of the world contain special provisions for indigenous communities, granting them particular rights and regulating their traditional political institutions and customary law. Building on rational theories of constitution-making, we employ a demand and supply framework to explain the constitutionalization of such provisions. To test our hypotheses, we code the presence of indigenous provisions in the current constitutions of 193 United Nations member states. We find full democracy and previous conflict to stimulate the inclusion of indigenous group rights but not of customary law and traditional institutions. Customary law and traditional institutions are more likely constitutionalized in countries with high ethnic fractionalization. Low levels of modernity affect particularly the constitutionalization of traditional political institutions, while low levels of development correlate with provisions on customary law. Former British colonies are more likely to constitutionalize customary law.