Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East
Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East
复制标题
防政变：在中东的实践和后果
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1999
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
James T. Quinlivan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
James T. Quinlivan
在美国战后-在海湾战争中，萨达姆领导的联军击败了伊拉克，许多观察家认为，萨达姆侯赛因最终将在军事政变中被推翻。然而，在多年的希望破灭之后，很少有人认为伊拉克军方可能采取这种行动。许多分析人士声称，伊拉克政权事实上是政变的证明。萨达姆·侯赛因的持久力应该会促使任何以类似方式领导的美国联盟不仅重新考虑政变和政变的可能性，而且重新考虑如何打击和击败一个不受政变影响的政权。在这篇文章中，我分析了国家如何成为政变的证据，特别关注沙特阿拉伯，伊拉克和叙利亚为实现这一目标所采取的政策。这些政策包括依赖对政权特别忠诚的团体，建立平行的军事组织和多个国内安全机构。美国对这些国家如何使其政权不受政变影响特别感兴趣。沙特阿拉伯是美国的重要盟友，伊拉克是一个敌对国家，叙利亚介于两者之间。然而，美国与伊拉克或叙利亚之间的冲突，使一个注意力集中时间很短的超级大国与那些接受严重限制其充分发挥军事潜力的政权对立。这两个国家都发展了高度政治化的军队，只要他们的领导人继续转移资源来保护他们的政权，他们就无法实现这一潜力。与此同时，他们创造了一个军事化的政治，在失败面前具有惊人的弹性。如果以美国为首的联盟决定通过军事行动推翻一个政变政权，它将不得不认真关注该政权的真正基础。战地指挥官需要更广泛的手段来了解对手的政治军事形势，并更深入地了解联军的政治意图。此外，政治军事行动的协调将需要更多的政治参与
In the aftermath of the U.S.-led coalition’s defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War, many observers believed that Saddam Hussein would eventually be toppled in a military coup. After years of dashed hopes, however, few expect that the Iraqi military is likely to undertake such action. Many analysts claim that the Iraqi regime is, in fact, coup-proof. Saddam Hussein’s staying power should cause any similarly led U.S. coalition to rethink not just the possibilities of both coups and coupprooang but how it would aght and defeat a coup-proof regime. In this article, I analyze how states become coup-proof, focusing speciacally on the policies that Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria have adopted to achieve this goal. These policies include reliance on groups with special loyalties to the regime and the creation of parallel military organizations and multiple internal security agencies. The United States has a particular interest in how these countries have made their regimes coup-proof. Saudi Arabia is an important U.S. ally, Iraq is a hostile state, and Syria is somewhere in between. Conoict between the United States and either Iraq or Syria, however, pits a superpower with a short attention span against regimes that have accepted serious constraints on their ability to exercise their full military potential. Both states have developed heavily politicized militaries that are incapable of realizing this potential as long as their leaderships continue to divert resources to protect their regimes. At the same time, they have created a militarized politics that is surprisingly resilient in the face of defeat. If a U.S-led coalition decides that it wants to overthrow a coup-proofed regime through military action, it will have to devote serious attention to the regime’s true underpinnings. Field commanders will need more extensive means of understanding their opponent’s political-military situation and greater insight into the coalition’s political intentions. Moreover, the coordination of political-military operations will require greater political involvement