Cooperation for Pennies: A Note on[epsiv]-Equilibria
Cooperation for Pennies: A Note on[epsiv]-Equilibria
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便士合作：关于[epsiv]-均衡的注释
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0100
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
J. Conlon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Conlon
本文证明了在无限次重复光滑博弈中，e -均衡能够支持完全合作直到视界的尽头，而非理性的量很小，e。此外，行为，即使接近地平线的尽头，也对假设的非理性程度高度不敏感。经济文献分类号：C73，L13。
Abstract It is shown that, in finitely repeated smooth games, e -equilibria are capable of supporting full cooperation up to very near the end of the horizon, with very small amounts of irrationality, e . Furthermore, behavior, even near the end of the horizon, is highly insensitive to the amount of irrationality assumed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, L13.