Communication in Economic Mechanisms
Communication in Economic Mechanisms
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经济机制沟通
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Thomas
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I. Segal;Susan Athey;Jonathan Levin;Eric Maskin;Paul R. Milgrom;Andy Postlewaite;Thomas
本章考虑的问题. nding分配，满足一定的社会目标时，经济代理人有私人信息，他们的喜好。虽然经济学家传统上考虑的问题，提供激励的代理人充分揭示他们的偏好，这种充分的启示往往是不切实际的或不可取的，有几个原因：（1）它可能需要以比特或真实的数字测量的禁止量的通信，（2）代理评估其完整的偏好可能是昂贵的，以及（3）所揭示的信息可能被设计者或其他代理人利用。因此，我们考虑的问题是：什么是最低限度的信息，必须从代理，以实现目标？请注意，即使可以指望代理人如实报告，问题也会出现。Segal（2005）表明，对于一大类社会问题，任何最低限度的信息方式来验证给定的替代方案是可取的，相当于给每个代理人（0427770）。我还要感谢我的讨论者罗杰·迈尔森（Roger Myerson），以及许多研讨会和会议报告的参与者，在这些研讨会和会议上，我们介绍了本章中调查的一些研究。特别是，Sjostrom和James Jordan讨论了与此主题有关的问题。最后，我要感谢我的合著者诺姆·尼森和罗纳德·法德尔，他们帮助我澄清了我对本章所讨论主题的理解。1一个"预算集"-社会备选方案的子集（通常可以用个性化的非线性价格来描述），并要求每个代理验证所提出的备选方案在他的预算集中对他是最优的。因此，任何能解决社会问题的沟通机制，也必须产生一个支持性的价格均衡。这一结果正式证实了哈耶克关于价格作为解决社会协调问题所需的最低限度沟通的作用的见解。需要揭示价格的问题种类相当多。例如，它包括诸如精确或近似的效率、自愿参与、群体偏差的稳定性以及一些公平的概念等社会目标。对于这样的目标，价格披露是必要的，无论偏好域，这允许非凸性或离散决策（例如，如在组合拍卖或匹配问题中）。另一方面，价格的具体形式取决于问题。Segal（2005）提出了一种算法，用于推导价格均衡的形式，以验证...
This chapter considers the problem of …nding allocations that satisfy certain social goals when economic agents have private information about their preferences. While economists have traditionally considered the problem of providing incentives for agents to fully reveal their preferences, such full revelation is often impractical or undesirable, for several reasons: (1) it may require a prohibitive amount of communication as measured in bits or real numbers, (2) it may be costly for agents to evaluate their complete preferences, and (3) the revealed information may be exploited by the designer or other agents. Thus, we consider the question: What is the minimal information that must be elicited from the agents in order to achieve the goals? Note that the question arises even if agents can be counted on to report truthfully. Segal (2005) shows that for a large class of social problems, any minimally informative way to verify that a given alternative is desirable is equivalent to giving each agent 0427770). I also thank my discussant, Roger Myerson, and the participants of too many seminars and conference presentations where some of the research surveyed in the chapter was presented. In particular, Sjostrom, and James Jordan for discussions related to this topic. Last but not least, I am indebted to my coauthors Noam Nisan and Ronald Fadel for helping clarify my understanding of the topics discussed in this chapter. 1 a " budget set " –a subset of the social alternatives (which could in general be described by personalized nonlinear prices), and asking each agent to verify that the proposed alternative is optimal to him within his budget set. Therefore, any communication mechanism that yields a solution to the social problem must also yield a supporting price equilibrium. This result formalizes Hayek's insight about the role of prices as minimal communication needed to solve the social coordination problems. The class of problems for which price revelation is necessary proves quite large. For example, it includes such social goals as exact or approximate e¢ ciency, voluntary participation, stability to group deviations, and some notions of fairness. For such goals, price revelation is necessary regardless of the preference domain, which allows for nonconvexities or discrete decisions (e.g., as in combinatorial auctions or matching problems). On the other hand, the particular form of prices to be used depends on the problem. Segal (2005) suggests an algorithm for deriving the form of price equilibria that verify …
剑桥:剑桥大学出版社
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Shirai;Y.. Aspect. In P. C. Hogan (Ed.)
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Y.. Aspect. In P. C. Hogan (Ed.)