ANALYZING AND REVISING A TWO-WAY PROTOCOL FOR QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH A NONMAXIMALLY ENTANGLED QUBIT PAIR
ANALYZING AND REVISING A TWO-WAY PROTOCOL FOR QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH A NONMAXIMALLY ENTANGLED QUBIT PAIR
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DOI：
10.1142/s0219749911007885
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发表时间：
2011-11
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
Zhihao Liu;Hanwu Chen;Wenjie Liu;Wenjie Liu;Juan Xu;Zhiqiang Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhihao Liu;Hanwu Chen;Wenjie Liu;Wenjie Liu;Juan Xu;Zhiqiang Li
对Shimizu，Tamaki and Chuanasaka（STF）[Phys. Rev. A80（2009）022323]提出的量子密码第二协议（STF-B）的安全性进行了一般性分析，表明STF-B协议在一种广义攻击下是脆弱的。推导了Eve能够成功攻击消息M而不引入错误的充要条件。结果表明，Qin等人[Phys.Rev.A82（2010）036301]提出的相关诱导攻击策略是该充分必要条件的一个特例.其次，我们提出了一个有效的和高效的战略，以防止一般攻击。因此，STF-B协议被修改为一个安全的，通过改进的控制模式。
The security of the second (STF-B) protocol of quantum cryptography proposed by Shimizu, Tamaki and Fukasaka (STF) [Phys. Rev. A80 (2009) 022323] is analyzed in a general way, which shows that the STF-B protocol is vulnerable under a kind of generalized attack. Sufficient and necessary condition for which Eve can successfully attack the message M without introducing errors is deduced. It shows that the correlation-elicitation (CE) attack strategy found by Qin et al. [Phys. Rev. A82 (2010) 036301] is a special case of the sufficient and necessary condition. Next, we advance an effective and efficient strategy to prevent the general attack. Hence, the STF-B protocol is revised to a secure one by improving the control mode.