Rare Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy in Large Static Games
Rare Nash Equilibria and the Price of Anarchy in Large Static Games
复制标题
DOI：
10.1287/moor.2018.0929
复制
发表时间：
2017-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Lacker;K. Ramanan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Lacker;K. Ramanan
本文研究了有限个智能体的静态博弈，其中智能体被分配了独立的同分布随机类型，每个智能体通过选择不同的随机变量来最小化其目标函数。
We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choo...