Markov-Perfect Network Formation An Applied Framework for Bilateral Oligopoly and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks ∗
Markov-Perfect Network Formation An Applied Framework for Bilateral Oligopoly and Bargaining in Buyer-Seller Networks ∗
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马尔可夫完美网络形成买卖双方网络中双边寡头垄断和讨价还价的应用框架*
DOI：
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kyna Fong
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Robin S. Lee;Kyna Fong
我们开发了一个易于处理和适用的动态模型的网络形成与转移存在外部性。我们的主要应用是对双边寡头垄断和买卖双方网络中原语的估计和反事实结果的预测。该框架以每个主体的静态利润为原语，提供了均衡的循环网络类别和协商转移。重要的是，代理预测网络未来的变化，而连接的形成、维护或中断可能代价高昂。我们详细介绍了在这种环境下马尔可夫完美均衡的计算和估计，并强调了使用由保险公司-医院谈判驱动的模拟数据的方法。我们探讨了医院合并对协商支付、保险公司保费和消费者福利的影响，并展示了动态会计如何产生与传统静态方法截然不同的预测。
We develop a tractable and applicable dynamic model of network formation with transfers in the presence of externalities. Our primary application is the estimation of primitives and prediction of counterfactual outcomes in bilateral oligopoly and buyer-seller networks. The framework takes as primitives each agent’s static profits, and provides the equilibrium recurrent class of networks and negotiated transfers. Importantly, agents anticipate future changes to the network, and links may be costly to form, maintain, or break. We detail the computation and estimation of a Markov-Perfect equilibrium in this environment, and highlight the approach using simulated data motivated by insurer-hospital negotiations. We explore the impact of hospital mergers on negotiated payments, insurer premiums, and consumer welfare, and demonstrate how accounting for dynamics yields substantively different predictions than traditional static approaches.
纵向讨价还价和反补贴能力
DOI：
10.1257/mic.6.3.106
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
Microeconomics
影响因子：
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作者：
Iozzi A
通讯作者：
Iozzi A