False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
False-name-proof voting with costs over two alternatives
复制标题
防假名投票的成本超过两种选择
DOI：
10.1007/s00182-013-0397-3
复制
发表时间：
2013
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Vincent Conitzer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Liad Wagman;Vincent Conitzer
在开放、匿名的环境中，如互联网，代理可以以不同的身份多次参与一个机制。如果没有代理人从参与一次以上中获益，则该机制是防假名的。不幸的是，虚假名称证明机制的设计受到了各种负面结果的阻碍。在本文中，我们将展示如何通过现实的假设来规避这些负面结果，即获得额外的身份是以（潜在的小）成本。我们认为任意的成本和应用我们的结果的背景下，有两种选择的投票模型。
In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, agents can participate in a mechanism multiple times under different identities. A mechanism is false-name-proof if no agent ever benefits from participating more than once. Unfortunately, the design of false-name-proof mechanisms has been hindered by a variety of negative results. In this paper, we show how some of these negative results can be circumvented by making the realistic assumption that obtaining additional identities comes at a (potentially small) cost. We consider arbitrary such costs and apply our results within the context of a voting model with two alternatives.
影响因子：
--
作者：
Atsushi Iwasaki;Vincent Conitzer;Yoshifusa Omori;Y. Sakurai;Taiki Todo;M. Guo;M. Yokoo
通讯作者：
Atsushi Iwasaki;Vincent Conitzer;Yoshifusa Omori;Y. Sakurai;Taiki Todo;M. Guo;M. Yokoo