Factor Reallocation in Eastern Germany after Reunification
Factor Reallocation in Eastern Germany after Reunification
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统一后东德要素重新配置
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发表时间：
2006
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通讯作者：
M. Burda
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作者：
M. Burda
统一15年后，前东德德国的经济正在好转。自1995年以来，不包括建筑业的工业生产增长了60%以上，自2000年以来增长了28%，而在后一时期，西德德国的增长率仅为4%左右。自1991年以来，真实的国内生产总值每年增长3.5%，仅制造业每年增长8.2%。东西方之间超过一半的劳动生产率差距和超过三分之一的人均GDP差距已经缩小，所用的时间比罗伯特·J.巴罗（1991）预测的要短得多。如表1所示，尽管近几年来趋同速度有所放缓，但在劳动力市场仍是最困难的，但在一系列指标上，趋同令人印象深刻。尽管有这些积极的消息，从东部到西部的净移民仍在继续--自2000年以来，每年约有7万人，占人口的0.5%，特别集中在18至25岁的人群中。与此同时，新的实物资本继续流入东方--每年800亿至900亿欧元，约占GDP的20%。生产要素的重新分配是德国统一最令人印象深刻的方面之一。自1991年以来，超过1.2万亿欧元的新投资（以1995年价格计算）花在了东德，但同期内，东德德国的劳动力减少了大约120万人，即15%;而西德的就业人数却增加了4.1%。如图1所示，要素流动的强度并非恒定不变，而是起初相当高，到1990年代开始下降。1990年代初，移徙人数最多，直到1990年代中期才有所下降，2001年之前再次上升，此后又有所下降。此外，德国东部的累积投资流中有很大一部分（三分之二）专门用于住宅和商业结构，而商业设备约占三分之一。结构投资支出的大幅增加往往归咎于扭曲的投资激励措施，可能对产出结构和要素需求产生长期影响（Hans-Werner Sinn and Gerlinde Sinn，1992）。生产要素向相反方向的密集流动很难解释为对技术、偏好或需求扰动的反应。用霍斯特·西伯特（Horst Siebert，1992）的术语来说，德国遭受了大规模的一体化冲击。我给经济一体化下了这样的定义：两个或两个以上地理区域通过它们的联合而可能实现的有效生产模式，以世界市场价格衡量。德国的一体化事件提供了一个独特的机会来研究这种形式的经济一体化和调整成本的相对重要性在决定中的作用。讨论者：Hans-Werner Sinn，CES-ifo和慕尼黑大学; Nicola Fuchs-Schundeln，哈佛大学; Claudia Buch，图宾根大学。
Fifteen years after reunification, the economy of the former East Germany is on the mend. Industrial production excluding construction has expanded by more than 60 percent since 1995 and by 28 percent since 2000, compared with only about 4 percent in West Germany, for the latter period. Real GDP has grown 3.5 percent per year since 1991 and 8.2 percent annually in the manufacturing industry alone. More than half of the measured labor productivity gap and more than a third of the GDP per capita gap between East and West have been closed, in considerably less time than predicted by Robert J. Barro (1991). As Table 1 shows, convergence has been impressive on a wide array of indicators, although it has slowed in recent years and remains most difficult in the labor market. Despite this positive news, net migration continues from East to West—about 70,000, or 0.5 percent of the population, per annum since 2000, especially concentrated among 18to 25year-olds. At the same time, new physical capital continues to flow into the East—80 to 90 billion euros, or about 20 percent of GDP each year. The reallocation of production factors is one of the most impressive aspects of German unification. Since 1991, more than 1.2 trillion euros of new investment (in 1995 prices) was spent in the East, yet the workforce of East Germany shrank by roughly 1.2 million, or 15 percent, over the same period; employment rose in the West by 4.1 percent. As Figure 1 shows, the intensity of factor movement was not constant, but rather high at first, and declining into the 1990s. Migration was greatest in the early 1990s, falling until mid-decade, rising again until 2001, and declining since. In addition, a large fraction (two-thirds) of the cumulated investment flow in Eastern Germany was dedicated to residential and business structures, compared with about one-third in business equipment. The large runup in investment spending on structures is often blamed on distorted investment incentives, with possible longer-run consequences for the structure of output and factor demands (Hans-Werner Sinn and Gerlinde Sinn, 1992). This intensive movement of production factors in opposite directions is difficult to explain as a reaction to disturbances in technology, preferences, or demand. To use Horst Siebert’s (1992) terminology, Germany was hit by a massive integration shock. I offer the following definition of economic integration: the achievement of the efficient production pattern by two or more geographic regions made possible by their union, measured at world market prices. The German integration episode presents a unique opportunity to study this form of economic integration and the roles of the relative importance of adjustment costs in determin† Discussants: Hans-Werner Sinn, CES-ifo and University of Munich; Nicola Fuchs-Schundeln, Harvard University; Claudia Buch, University of Tubingen.