AGAINST EMPATHY
AGAINST EMPATHY
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DOI：
10.1111/j.2041-6962.2011.00069.x
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发表时间：
2011-01-01
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Prinz, Jesse
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Prinz, Jesse
移情可以被描述为一个人在反思另一个人的情感时所经历的替代情感。同理心有时被认为是道德判断的先决条件。这似乎是休谟的观点。我回顾了移情可能被视为先决条件的各种方式，并对每一种方式进行了反驳：移情不是一个组成部分，一个必要的原因，一个可靠的认识指南，一个理由的基础，或者我们道德判断背后的动力。事实上，共情很容易产生偏见，这可能会造成潜在的伤害。另一种构造关注的情况要好一些，但它的用途也有限。我认为，道德判断涉及的不是共情，而是愤怒、厌恶、内疚和钦佩等情绪。这些，而不是移情，为道德提供了情感基础。
Empathy can be characterized as a vicarious emotion that one person experiences when reflecting on the emotion of another. So characterized, empathy is sometimes regarded as a precondition on moral judgment. This seems to have been Hume's view. I review various ways in which empathy might be regarded as a precondition and argue against each of them: empathy is not a component, a necessary cause, a reliable epistemic guide, a foundation for justification, or the motivating force behind our moral judgments. In fact, empathy is prone to biases that render it potentially harmful. Another construct-concern-fares somewhat better, but it is also of limited use. I argue that, instead of empathy, moral judgments involve emotions such as anger, disgust, guilt, and admiration. These, not empathy, provide the sentimental foundation for morality.