Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse?
Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse?
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DOI：
10.1126/science.1159478
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发表时间：
2008-09-19
期刊：
影响因子：
56.9
通讯作者：
Lynham, John
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Costello, Christopher;Gaines, Steven D.;Lynham, John
最近的报告表明，世界上大多数商业渔业可能在几十年内崩溃。尽管常常牵涉到糟糕的渔业治理，但对解决办法的评估仍然很少。生物经济学理论和案例研究表明，基于权利的渔获量份额可以为不太容易崩溃的可持续收获提供个人激励。为了检验渔获量分享渔业改革是否实现了这些假定的好处，我们汇编了一个全球渔业机构数据库和1950年至2003年11,135个渔业的渔获量统计数据。渔获量份额的实施阻止了，甚至逆转了全球大范围崩溃的趋势。体制变革有可能极大地改变全球渔业的未来。
Recent reports suggest that most of the world's commercial fisheries could collapse within decades. Although poor fisheries governance is often implicated, evaluation of solutions remains rare. Bioeconomic theory and case studies suggest that rights- based catch shares can provide individual incentives for sustainable harvest that is less prone to collapse. To test whether catch- share fishery reforms achieve these hypothetical benefits, we have compiled a global database of fisheries institutions and catch statistics in 11,135 fisheries from 1950 to 2003. Implementation of catch shares halts, and even reverses, the global trend toward widespread collapse. Institutional change has the potential for greatly altering the future of global fisheries.