Scheduling preferences, parking competition, and bottleneck congestion: A model of trip timing and parking location choices by heterogeneous commuters
Scheduling preferences, parking competition, and bottleneck congestion: A model of trip timing and parking location choices by heterogeneous commuters
复制标题
DOI：
10.1016/j.trc.2020.102677
复制
发表时间：
2020-08
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yuki Takayama;M. Kuwahara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yuki Takayama;M. Kuwahara
这项研究考察了随时间变化的拥堵通行费和依赖于位置的停车费对不同通勤者的行为及其通勤成本的影响。为此，我们建立了不同通勤者的出行时间和停车地点选择模型，并刻画了该模型的均衡性。通过比较有无定价政策的均衡结果，我们得到以下结论：(1)征收停车费和扩大停车量可能会集中交通需求的时间分布，从而加剧交通拥堵；(2)当不征收停车费时，停车量的扩大并不一定会导致帕累托改进；(3)停车费和拥堵通行费相结合实现了社会最优；(4)道路定价和停车收入分别等于最优瓶颈容量和最优停车能力的成本；即瓶颈容量和停车容量分别适用自融资原理。
This study examines the effects of a time-varying congestion toll and a location-dependent parking fee on the behavior of heterogeneous commuters and their commuting costs. To this end, we develop a model of departure time and parking location choices by heterogeneous commuters and characterize its equilibrium. By comparing the equilibrium with and without pricing policies, we obtain the following results: (1) imposing a parking fee and expanding parking capacity may concentrate the temporal distribution of traffic demand, thereby exacerbating traffic congestion; (2) the expansion of parking capacity does not necessarily lead to a Pareto improvement when a parking fee is not imposed; (3) the social optimum is achieved by combining a parking fee with a congestion toll; and (4) the revenue obtained from pricing of roads and parking exactly equals the costs for optimal bottleneck and parking capacities, respectively; that is, the self-financing principle holds separately for bottleneck capacity and parking capacity.